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The Dismissal of Prime Ministers in the Asian
Commonwealth: Comparing Democratic
Deconsolidation in Malaysia and Sri Lanka
ASANGA WELIKALA
Abstract
This article comparatively analyses processes of democratic deconsolidation in the Asian
Commonwealth states of Malaysia and Sri Lanka by examining two recent constitutional
crises in which the head of state dismissed, or attempted to dismiss, the serving prime minis-
ter during a parliamentary term. These episodes brought to a close fledgling reform move-
ments that had obtained historic electoral mandates in both countries. The article discusses
the Westminster-derived constitutional provisions concerning government formation as well
as the distinctive features of political culture that animate those formal frameworks in the
two countries. It is argued that while Malaysia and Sri Lanka possess the formal institutions
of liberal democracy that notionally enable both pluralistic democracy and greater democrati-
sation, their political cultures still have sufficient potency to be a counteracting force against
the deeper consolidation of constitutional democracy. Democratisation therefore remains a
work in progress in both countries.
Keywords: Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Commonwealth, dismissal of prime minister, democratic
deconsolidation
Introduction
THE DISMISSAL OF the prime minister by the
head of state in the middle of the parliamen-
tary term is a constitutional issue that has
recently arisen in the Asian Commonwealth
countries of Malaysia and Sri Lanka. The Sri
Lankan constitutional crisis of October to
December 2018 was precipitated when the
president purported to dismiss and replace
the prime minister, but this unilateral and
unconstitutional action was successfully
resisted by parliament and the courts. In less
dramatic but nevertheless controversial cir-
cumstances in Malaysia, the apparent disin-
tegration of the governing coalition formed
the basis of the successful replacement of the
prime minister by the king in February to
March 2020. In this article, I comparatively
analyse the law and the politics of these two
episodes with two aims in mind. Firstly, to
understand how the similar Westminster-
derived legal framework of government for-
mation functions in the two different
contexts within the Asian Commonwealth.
Secondly, I explore what they reveal about
the state of constitutional democracy in the
two countries by looking at the underlying
causal factors of political culture.
It may not seem obvious in terms purely
of constitutional form why Malaysia, a
Southeast Asian federal parliamentary monar-
chy, and Sri Lanka, a South Asian unitary
presidential republic, are appropriate sub-
jects of comparative study, but there are his-
torical, institutional, and cultural similarities
that make their comparative analysis particu-
larly apt. As former British colonies, they
share a constitutional inheritance informed
by the principles of the English common law
and British parliamentary practice. Their con-
stitutional provisions governing the appoint-
ment of the prime minister by the head of
state are similar, and reflect the twin princi-
ples of confidence and responsibility derived
from the Westminster heritage. Indeed, Sir
Ivor Jennings, the leading constitution-maker
in the era of British decolonisation in Asia,
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played a significant role in the drafting of
both countries’ independence constitutions.1
But they are not identical because the frame-
works have been adapted to reflect the local
contexts. In Malaysia, the independence con-
stitution of 1957 remains in force, albeit with
several major reformations of the underlying
political settlement. While Sri Lanka has had
three constitutions since independence in
1948, the requirements of confidence and
responsibility underpinning the appointment
of the prime minister have remained broadly
the same, and have survived the turn to
republicanism and semi-presidentialism in the
1970s.
But perhaps the most compelling reason
for a comparative analysis is the similar
recent pattern of the rise and fall of
democratisation in Malaysia and Sri Lanka.2
The path dependency of the postcolonial
style of statecraft involving ethnocratic poli-
tics and clientelist leadership came under
challenge by noteworthy pro-democracy
coalitions built across politics and civil soci-
ety in response to authoritarianism and cor-
ruption. These movements resulted in a
change of government with a clear electoral
mandate for democratising reform. However,
the reformist political coalitions disintegrated
midway, significantly owing to personality
clashes in the elite leadership, but exacer-
bated by other, more structural, weaknesses
of political cultures. As a result, a constitu-
tional crisis erupted and led to the loss of
power by reformists, signifying the onset of
a period of ‘democratic deconsolidation’.3
The selection of the prime
minister by the head of state in
the Commonwealth
In British constitutional practice, the selection
of the prime minister is one of the few
remaining personal prerogatives of the mon-
arch. It is also seen as unique among them
because it involves a special type of exemp-
tion from the requirement of ministerial
advice. There appear to be three underlying
reasons why the monarch is not required to
select an incoming prime minister on the
advice of the departing one. Firstly, the
responsibility for advice relies upon the ulti-
mate sanction of loss of office, and this force
is lost when it has already been determined
that the serving prime minister is to stand
down. Secondly, a prime minister who has
lost the confidence of the house, or has been
defeated in a general election, does not com-
mand the confidence of the house, and thus
cannot offer responsible advice. And thirdly,
there is no way of ensuring that departing
prime ministers’ advice as to their successors
would be without partisanship or caprice.4 A
prime minister who has not lost confidence
or been defeated in an election, but is resign-
ing for personal reasons, may offer views on
the succession for the consideration of the
monarch, but the established principle is that
the monarch is not constitutionally obliged
to act on this.
The exercise of this power is, in turn, subject
to two stipulations consistent with modern
democracy. While the monarch is personally
responsible for the selection of the prime min-
ister, the accountability for the decision is
placed on the incoming prime minister. Thus,
if the monarch has acted inappropriately, the
person invited to form the government could
decline acceptance.5 More importantly, the
recognition that this is a personal prerogative
is not to say that it is a discretion unqualified
by implied limitations. The general require-
ment is that the monarch must ‘secure the
strongest Government in the minimum time’.6
A substantive limitation therefore is that the
monarch must not choose a prime minister on
partisan or subjective considerations, but by
reference to what would be acceptable to the
house. It follows from this that a procedural
limitation on the prerogative would be that the
person sent for would, normally, enjoy the
support of a majority in the house.
While confidence in the prime minister is
normally expressed with the support of a
majority, there may be occasions when no
such majority exists. A hung parliament is
the most common example. Another is
where the serving prime minister has lost
confidence, but the leader of the opposition
cannot readily command the confidence of
an alternative majority. To accommodate
these situations, the flexibility of the preroga-
tive is again helpful, by facilitating the for-
mation of governing coalitions, minority
governments, or confidence and supply
arrangements, until such time as a general
election can be held.
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Across the Asian Commonwealth, these
Westminster conventions find legal expres-
sion in written constitutions. But there is
some variation in both the level of textual
detail as well as the institutional architecture
of the relationships within the executive, and
between the executive and parliament. Bru-
nei and the Maldives are not relevant here,
as one is an absolute monarchy and the
other is a pure presidential system. Of the
others, the Indian constitution is the least
directory and the most reliant on conven-
tions, providing only for the basic function
of the head of state to appoint the prime
minister. The constitutions of Bangladesh
and Singapore condition the head of state’s
discretion in the appointment of the prime
minister explicitly by the requirement of the
support of a majority of the members of par-
liament. In Pakistan, the prime minister is
elected by an affirmative vote of the majority
of the members of the lower house.7
The Malaysian and Sri Lankan procedures
are examples of this variety, but in order to
compare the two, it is first necessary to have
an idea of their broader constitutional frame-
works of executive power. In this regard,
Malaysia has retained its more classically
Westminster parliamentary–monarchical char-
acter, while in Sri Lanka there is a ‘premier–
presidential’ model of semi-presidentialism,
which nevertheless regulates the relationship
between the head of state and the prime min-
ister according to Westminster conventions.8
The king and the prime minister in
Malaysia
The executive power of the federation is for-
mally vested in the constitutional monarch—
the King of Malaysia or Yang di-Pertuan
Agong—which he generally exercises on the
advice of ministers, except where the consti-
tution requires him to act in his own discre-
tion (Articles 39 and 40(1)). The appointment
of the prime minister is the first of the func-
tions under the constitution that the king
may exercise according to his own discretion
(Article 40(2)(a)). Article 43(2)(a) then pro-
vides that, ‘the Yang di-Pertuan Agong shall
. . . appoint as Perdana Menteri (Prime Minis-
ter) . . . a member of the House of Represen-
tatives who in his judgment is likely to
command the confidence of the majority of
the members of that House’. The question
whether from this the king also has an
implied power to dismiss the prime minister
remains unclear. The wording of Article 43
(4) puts the onus on the prime minister to
tender the resignation of the cabinet if he
ceases to command the confidence of the
majority in the lower house (unless he
requests a dissolution), but does not state
what the king should do if the prime minis-
ter does not resign, or does not request a dis-
solution.9
The provisions of Articles 40(2)(a), 43(2)(a),
and 43(4) are thus at the heart of the rela-
tionship between the head of state and the
prime minister. Article 40 formally grants
the king a personal discretion to act without
ministerial advice in the appointment of the
prime minister, which Article 43 qualifies by
limiting the scope of that discretion to exer-
cising his judgement as to which member of
the lower house can command the confi-
dence of a majority of that house. What con-
stitutes a majority is not defined—for
example, whether of the whole membership
or simply of those present at a vote of confi-
dence—and then whether the requirement is
a simple or absolute majority. But it seems
to be generally understood that majority
means an absolute majority of the whole
membership of the Dewan Rakyat.10 The
express requirement that confidence means
the support of a majority in the lower house
precludes minority governments. This is
more restrictive than the analogous provi-
sion in Sri Lanka, where these is no reference
to a ‘majority’.
These provisions had, however, never
been tested given the overwhelming coali-
tion majorities enjoyed by prime ministers
for so much of Malaysian postcolonial his-
tory. It was only in the 2018 general election
that the dominant coalition lost power, and
set the stage for an examination of how the
relation between head of state and prime
minister might work in a more diffused con-
figuration of parliamentary representation.
While there are political precedents and judi-
cial pronouncements at the subnational level
about how chief ministers are appointed and
dismissed (according to a similar Westmin-
ster-style framework as at the federal level),
there seems to be considerable ambivalence
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about what the constitutional rules may
mean in practice.11
The president and the prime minister
in Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka began its postcolonial existence
with a classical Westminster-style constitu-
tion, but has had a semi-presidential system
since the 1978 constitution. Executive power
is exercised by a directly elected fixed-term
president and a prime minister and cabinet
of ministers drawn from parliament and
responsible to it. The president is both head
of state and head of government in the Sri
Lankan system. But the relationship between
the president and the prime minister has
found textual articulation in virtually the
same way as in the previous parliamentary
constitution of 1972, and with the Westmin-
ster conventions governing that relationship
under the constitution of 1947. Article 42(4)
provides that, ‘The President shall appoint
as Prime Minister the Member of Parliament,
who, in the President’s opinion, is most likely
to command the confidence of Parliament’.
As in Malaysia, this formulation reflects the
essential Westminster principle, but with two
differences. First, the presidential discretion
is to be inferred from the reference to the
president’s ‘opinion’, whereas the Malaysian
constitution stipulates clearly that the
appointment of the prime minister is a per-
sonal discretion of the king, the judgement
in relation to which may be exercised with-
out ministerial advice. This is consistent with
the semi-presidential framework, where the
elected executive president is only constitu-
tionally required to act on the advice on the
prime minister in the appointment and dis-
missal of other ministers. Second, there is no
requirement that confidence in the prime
minister is to be expressed with the support
of a majority in the house. In other words, the
Sri Lankan constitution does not preclude the
possibility of minority governments, which
are, in fact, occasionally demanded by the
constitutional asynchrony in the timing of
presidential and parliamentary elections. In
2015 and 2019, presidents were elected when
opposing parties held the parliamentary
majority and were required to appoint minor-
ity governments until parliamentary elections
could be held.
The fact that the prime minister may not
command a majority in the house has been
less consequential in the Sri Lankan context
because of the ballast provided by the execu-
tive presidency. It is buttressed by its own
electoral mandate and legitimacy indepen-
dent of parliament, and its own source of
substantive constitutional powers. Moreover,
except for three periods of ‘cohabitation’ in
1994, 2001–4, and 2015–19, which have been
exceptions to the norm, the 1978 constitution
has operated through ‘consolidated majority
government’, that is, the president and prime
minister have usually belonged to the same
majority in the legislature.12 Notwithstand-
ing these countervailing factors of power
and authority, however, it is not as if the
directly elected president can ignore parlia-
ment’s wishes in the appointment and dis-
missal of the prime minister. But the extent
to which parliament’s views are heeded has
varied according to the prevailing political
conditions.
It is in this context that the significant
reformation of the relationship between the
president and the prime minister by the
Nineteenth Amendment to the Constitution
enacted in 2015 assumes significance. While
maintaining the textual formulation of Arti-
cle 42(4), the Nineteenth Amendment trans-
formed the 1978 constitution from a
‘president–parliamentary’ to a ‘premier–pres-
idential’ model of semi-presidentialism, inter
alia, by strengthening the position of the
prime minister. The president can no longer
dismiss the prime minister, who now loses
office only on the loss of the confidence of
parliament in the government as a whole, by
death, resignation, or on ceasing to be a
member of parliament (Articles 46(2), 48).
The vacation of office by the prime minister
in any of these ways leads to the dissolution
of the cabinet and the fall of the government.
Together with the new requirement that
other ministers can now only be appointed
and dismissed by the president on the advice
of the prime minister, the removal of the
president’s power to dismiss the prime min-
ister indirectly changes the power of
appointment as well. The president’s discre-
tion of appointment is now more dependent
on the confidence of parliament in the prime
minister, for unless the latter commands the
confidence of the house, he cannot give the
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responsible advice for the formation of the
government. In other words, it is now parlia-
ment and not president that substantively
determines which member of parliament can
be appointed prime minister, even though
the formal appointment remains a function
of the president. But in Sri Lanka, as noted,
the prime minister does not formally need
the support of a majority of members to
claim the confidence of the house.
Constitutional crises and political
culture
The foregoing analysis of the formal legal
frameworks in Malaysia and Sri Lanka sets
out the institutional backdrop against which
to compare the two episodes of constitu-
tional crisis. These crises in turn allow us to
draw some conclusions about the state of
constitutional democratisation in the two
postcolonial countries. They reveal more
starkly than in normal times the agents and
practices—the political cultures—through
which formal institutions are animated.
Sri Lanka: the constitutional coup
crisis of 2018
President Mahinda Rajapaksa lost the presi-
dential election of January 2015 to a broad
coalition of political parties and a civil soci-
ety movement demanding constitutional
reform. He had won the war against Tamil
Tiger rebels, spearheading a triumphalist
nationalism of the Sinhala–Buddhist major-
ity, and entrenched presidential authoritari-
anism through the Eighteenth Amendment
to the Constitution in 2010. This removed
presidential term limits and procedural con-
straints on presidential powers. But the for-
mal removal of constitutional limitations,
and the creation of a culture of impunity
and excess through informal and illegal prac-
tices, generated the conditions for the Raja-
paksa regime’s undoing. The two aims of
the civil society groups and political parties
coalescing in opposition to the regime were
to remove Rajapaksa from office, and to
either abolish or reform the executive presi-
dency through a change to the constitution.
On defeating Rajapaksa, the new president
Maithripala Sirisena appointed the leader of
the opposition, Ranil Wickremesinghe, as
prime minister at the head of a minority
government. Even though parliament still
had a pro-Rajapaksa majority, the new gov-
ernment succeeded in enacting the Nine-
teenth Amendment in May 2015 with near-
unanimity in parliament. The Sirisena–Wick-
remesinghe coalition won a parliamentary
majority in the elections of August 2015, and
started a process of drafting a new constitu-
tion, which may have abolished presidential-
ism altogether. However, this process fell
victim to the unravelling of the reform coali-
tion from around 2017. The competing elec-
toral self-interest of both the president and
prime minister, defined by the practices of
the traditional political culture, trumped the
requirements of coalitional politics needed to
enact reform.
The irreversible breakdown in the crucial
relationship between president and prime
minister was registered in the constitutional
crisis of October–December 2018. On the
night of 26 October, Sirisena dismissed Wick-
remesinghe without warning, and replaced
him with Mahinda Rajapaksa (the former
president, now a member of parliament) as
prime minister. This was unconstitutional in
that Wickremesinghe had not lost the confi-
dence of parliament, and hence could not
be removed, as discussed above. After try-
ing and failing to assemble a parliamentary
majority for Rajapaksa, the president also
purported to dissolve parliament on 9
November, an act that was again unconstitu-
tional given that it occurred during a period
within which parliament could not be dis-
solved except with a resolution passed by a
two-thirds majority. The crisis eventually
ended in December when parliament con-
sistently refused to support Rajapaksa and
both the Court of Appeal and the Supreme
Court held the presidential acts to be uncon-
stitutional.
The new constitutional relationship between
the president and the prime minister was tri-
alled by ordeal in the crisis. As the relevant
constitutional provisions admit of no reason-
able interpretational doubts, in trying to
dismiss and replace the prime minister, the
president was either badly advised, or acted
on a political calculation that he could get
away with it notwithstanding the patent ille-
gality. But Wickremesinghe did not vacate
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office, and the parliamentary majority in his
favour—of 122 of 225 MPs, with the support
of two other parties outside his coalition—
consistently held up, despite strenuous
attempts by Rajapaksa and Sirisena to
induce defections. During the period of the
crisis, parliament passed two votes of no
confidence in the purported government of
Rajapaksa and a vote of confidence in Wick-
remesinghe. On an application for a writ of
quo warranto by all 122 MPs against the dis-
puted transfer of power, the Court of Appeal
issued an interim order denying Rajapaksa
the authority to hold the office of prime min-
ister (but as the crisis ended for other rea-
sons, the action was abandoned and the
court did not have an opportunity to hand
down a judgment to settle the matter).
In these ways, both parliament and the
courts played their role in counteracting an
act of ‘executive aggrandisement’.13 More
specifically, an important political precedent
was established for the proposition that, in
the appointment and dismissal of the prime
minister, it is the objective institutional facts
of who enjoys the confidence of, and respon-
sibility to, parliament that matter more than
the subjective preferences of the president.
While that seems like a valuable milestone
of deepening democratisation, it must be
asked why the crisis occurred in the first
place. A president and prime minister so
overtly elected to implement a programme
of reform were ultimately unable to prevail
over the entrenched counter-democratisation
political culture. Threatened by the regroup-
ing of the Rajapaksas, the president aban-
doned reform in the pursuit of the Sinhala–
Buddhist constituency. The prime minister
was tainted by a corruption scandal involv-
ing a questionable issuance of treasury
bonds, despite being elected to address Raja-
paksa corruption. Both were fatally damaged
by the governmental incompetence and neg-
ligence that led to the most significant terror-
ist attack since the end of the war on Easter
Sunday 2019.
The crisis ended the reform process, ren-
dered the government almost completely
dysfunctional, and worst of all, discredited
the notion of democratic reform in public
perceptions. This made possible the return of
the Rajapaksas to power in the next election
in November 2019, with an explicit promise
to roll back the Nineteenth Amendment and
reinstate populist presidentialism.14
Malaysia: the ousting of Dr Mahathir
Mohamad in 2020
The May 2018 general election in Malaysia
ended sixty-one years of single party domi-
nance by the United Malays National Organ-
isation (UMNO) led Barisan Nasional (BN),
which in various forms had held power
since independence. While its traditional
dominance had started dissolving some time
earlier, the significant cause of defeat was
the perceived involvement of prime minister
Najib Razak and his associates in the 1
Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB) cor-
ruption scandal (where it was alleged that
Malaysia’s sovereign wealth fund had been
used to channel enormous sums of public
money directly to Razak and his family
members and business associates).15 As in
Sri Lanka, however, despite the popular
mandate for reform, the entrenched struc-
tures of the Malaysian political culture
would ultimately defeat the democratic tran-
sition.
The Alliance of Hope (or Pakatan Harapan,
PH) which formed an alternative govern-
ment to the BN in 2018 for the first time was
led by Malaysia’s veteran leader Dr
Mahathir Mohamad and his erstwhile dep-
uty Anwar Ibrahim. Both are former senior
UMNO/BN leaders, with a chequered his-
tory of political friendship and enmity. They
came together to unite a fragmented opposi-
tion in the face of Razak’s entanglement in
the 1MDB scandal. While corruption and
clientelism are long-established features of
Malaysian political culture, public opposition
had been growing, registered by a gradual
erosion of electoral support for the UMNO/
BN since Anwar’s Reformasi movement
against Mahathir began in the 1990s, and
accelerated after notable civil society protests
in 2007. However, the scale of the corruption
allegedly involved in the 1MDB scandal
overshadowed any precedent. The uproar
caused by the global scandal (with subse-
quent investigations launched in at least ten
other countries) created the incentive for
Mahathir and Anwar to put together a broad
opposition coalition of Malay nationalists, an
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Islamic splinter group, minority ethnic par-
ties, and liberal reformists. The PH was a
coalition in many ways like the one that was
assembled in Sri Lanka to defeat Rajapaksa
in 2015, involving a large number of unlikely
partners united almost wholly with the aim
of ousting an unpopular leader.
Razak’s government deployed every
advantage of incumbency against the PH in
the election campaign and the transfer of
power after the election on 9 May 2018 was
not entirely smooth. After much manoeu-
vring, the king accepted Mahathir’s letter in
support of his appointment as prime minis-
ter with the signatures of all the 121 elected
PH MPs constituting a clear majority in the
222-member Dewan Rakyat.16 Although the
1MDB investigations commenced with alac-
rity, some of the misappropriated funds
recovered, and Razak put on trial, the PH
government’s reform record was mixed at
best.17 Many of the structural features of
Malaysian politics that had hindered demo-
cratic consolidation—the unhealthy nexus
between politics and business, the ‘personal-
istic fragmented party system’ and the ethni-
cisation of politics—were not, or could not
be, dismantled during the twenty-one
months of the PH government.18 Anti-cor-
ruption measures were uneven in applica-
tion, but where introduced, served to
generate disgruntlement within the political
and business elite. The heavily personalised
and ethnicised nature of political leadership
made for a weak, fluid, and ill-disciplined
party system, which could deliver neither
the stability or the compromises required for
democratisation. And these factors rendered
the uneasy alliance between Mahathir and
Anwar at the top of the government more
volatile than it should have been. By Decem-
ber 2019, the succession had become a bone
of contention not only between the support-
ers of Mahathir and Anwar but also third
parties who wished a turn at power.
The simmering tensions came to a head
when, on 24 February 2020, Mahathir
resigned as prime minister (although the
same day the king appointed him ‘Interim
Prime Minister’). This gambit was intended to
focus the minds of his bickering detractors as
to whether they wished to carry on with him,
or lose power to UMNO/BN. On 27 February
Mahathir announced that the king had
interviewed all MPs and found that no leader
commanded a majority to be the next prime
minister. In this context, the king, he stated,
was leaving it to the Dewan Rakyat to elect
the new prime minister. Within a few days,
Anwar’s faction and others had fallen in line
and reaffirmed their support for Mahathir.
However, Mahathir’s resignation also pro-
vided the opportunity for machinations by
others in the establishment who did not want
him to continue, or for Anwar to succeed
him. While by 29 February, the PH had
regrouped and claimed to have the majority
for Mahathir’s continuation in office, it
appeared that the palace in the meantime had
continued to take its own soundings of MPs’
views. The palace claimed that in those con-
sultations, despite the claims of PH, the
majority favoured Muhyiddin Yassin, who
had held office in both UMNO and PH gov-
ernments. The king thus appointed Muhyid-
din as prime minister on 1 March, and
although Mahathir and the PH vowed put
forward a motion—a ‘floor test’—to test his
support in the house, such a sitting never
took place.
Three factors explain why such an impor-
tant vote did not take place. Firstly, com-
pared to other Commonwealth legislatures
including Sri Lanka, the Dewan Rakyat meets
relatively infrequently, with long breaks in
between sessions and meetings. Before the
crisis, it had last met on 5 December 2019,
convening for a brief ceremonial meeting on
18 May 2020, and then again commenced
meetings from 13 July onwards. Secondly,
the executive has much greater control over
parliament and its business than in more
consolidated Westminster-style democracies.
Highlighting the advantages of incumbency
in the Malaysian system, once Muhyiddin
was appointed prime minister, this meant in
effect that no vote of confidence would take
place (at least until he was sure of winning
it). Thirdly, the coronavirus pandemic. Arriv-
ing almost simultaneously with the installa-
tion of the new government—and the
attendant requirements of lockdown and
social distancing—it provided Muhyiddin
with a convenient excuse not to recall parlia-
ment for an extended period, and time to
consolidate his majority. His appointment of
historically the largest Malaysian cabinet of
no less than seventy members clearly
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pointed to a clientelist process of regime con-
solidation while avoiding a floor test.
The Malaysian episode is clearly distinct
from the Sri Lankan one to the extent that
the king’s actions in the replacement of
Mahathir were not as unambiguously in vio-
lation of the legal provisions of the constitu-
tion as President Sirisena’s were. However,
the king’s actions do raise a question that
often arises in Westminster-style systems: a
course of action that may be strictly legal
may nevertheless be regarded as unconstitu-
tional.19 The complicated manoeuvrings
within the political elite doubtless invited
the king’s intercession. However, by 29
February both Mahathir and Muhyiddin
were claiming majorities. There was no plau-
sible basis for the king to accept the claims
of one against the other, except by testing
the rival claims on the floor of the house.
This would have been the course of action
that was consistent with the legal provisions
of the Malaysian constitution and the demo-
cratic assumptions underlying them. This
never happened, as noted. In choosing the
course of action he did, the king may have
been guided by practices of Malaysian politi-
cal culture, but it is at least strongly arguable
that the opportunity to set a valuable
democratising precedent was lost.20
Conclusion
As the analysis of their constitutional provi-
sions relating to government formation has
shown, Malaysia and Sri Lanka are, for-
mally, constitutional democracies based on
the liberal values of the Westminster system.
In addition to the institutional similarities
owing to historical reasons, as Common-
wealth member states today, they also sub-
scribe to the liberal democratic values of the
Commonwealth Charter. Both countries,
therefore, have in place the formal institu-
tions of democratisation and in Sri Lanka it
was further shown that formal constitutional
amendment to facilitate democratisation is
also possible under the right conditions.
However, the recent regime change epi-
sodes discussed in this article reveal the
political cultures through which those formal
constitutional provisions are operated. Politi-
cal cultures are constituted by agents and
the practices through which they pursue the
ends of politics. Those cultures are charac-
terised by a number of common features in
Malaysia and Sri Lanka. Formal constitu-
tional texts do not fully describe the political
realities of ethnocratic statecraft. Political
parties are weakly institutionalised, with lit-
tle discipline or internal democracy, making
them prone to fragmentation and unable to
implement a coherent policy platform,
let alone sustain transformative popular
mandates for constitutional and governance
reform. Weak parties result from, and per-
petuate, the personalisation of politics
around political entrepreneurs. Personalism
is fed by multiple factors including clientelist
understandings of social leadership in ethnic
cultures—the interventions of both president
and king were guided by a personalist con-
ception of the role of the head of state. All
these features in turn act as cultural incen-
tives to pervasive systemic corruption, both
financial and moral, and militate against the
objectives of democratisation, such as deper-
sonalised office, policy-based parties, hori-
zontal and vertical accountability between
elections, and transparency.
If the elections of 2015 in Sri Lanka and
2018 in Malaysia showed the promise of
democratisation that remains in these coun-
tries, the crises of 2018 in Sri Lanka and 2020
in Malaysia showed that the old political cul-
tures still have sufficient vitality to counter-
act incentives for reform. In both countries,
therefore, democratisation remains a work in
progress.
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